|
|
来源： 综合新闻
世界的下一个百年, 是中国的？还是美国的？
世界的下一个百年
何帆
地缘政治学家George Friedman极具想象力地预测了未来一百年全球政治格局的变化. 。
作为一个研究宏观经济的学者，如果要预测一年之后的事情，我都会觉得很不靠谱，更不用说五年、十年之后的事情了. 。但是，有一次出国开会，在机场的书店发现 一本书叫《下一个一百年》，居然预测的是未来一百年全球政治格局的变化. 。作者是George Friedman，美国的一位地缘政治学家. 。对作者的那份自信和勇气，我自叹不如。未来一百年是什么样呢？我来做个转述. 。
美国金融危机爆发后，很多人认为美国在全球的霸主地位受到了挑战，美国正在衰落。Friedman认为恰恰相反，他认为美国领导全球的时代才刚刚拉开帷 幕。21世纪，将是美国的时代。这一立论的基础是，全球地缘政治竞争的焦点已经从亚欧大陆转为对海权的竞争，而美国拥有独一无二的海上霸权。凡是有海洋的 地方，就有美国的舰队。美国控制了所有的海上贸易运输线，因此也就控制了整个全球经济体系. 。
很多人谈到'金砖四国'的崛起。Firedman对这几个国家都不看好。在他看来，中国从地缘政治的角度来看只是一个孤岛：中国的北部是人烟罕至的西伯利 亚、西部是沙漠和戈壁、南部是青藏高原和横断山脉。中国朝东面向浩瀚的太平洋，但却缺乏强大的海军。因此，中国历来都没有对外扩张的野心和能力。印度和巴 西也受到地理位置的制约。印度孤悬南亚大陆，而且内部各邦之间差异极大。巴西的势力从来没有超过南美洲。巴西最关心的事情不是全球政治，而是阿根廷在干什 么。
在金砖四国中，短期内（他的短期是指未来十年二十年）最有扩张冲动的是俄罗斯。俄罗斯是一个地域广阔、资源丰富但人口稀少的国家，而且俄罗斯的西部是一片 平原，一马平川，无险可守。当年拿破仑入侵俄罗斯走的就是这条通道，希特勒进攻俄罗斯走的也是这条通道。为了保证自己的安全，俄罗斯一定会尽可能的把国境 线向西推进，'以空间换取时间'。如果国境线离莫斯科能远一天的路程，俄罗斯就能获得多一天的动员时间。而且，普京上台之后，放弃了苏联的工业化模式，转 为依赖能源的出口。能源出口使得俄罗斯的国力突然大增，而且，能源也会变成俄罗斯对外讨价还价的砝码。乌克兰不听话，断你的气，欧洲国家不让步，断你的 油、断你的气，那些进口俄罗斯能源的国家，就会像吸毒一样越来越上瘾，越来越有依赖性。
但是，Friedman预言：俄罗斯很可能会撑不下去，有一天终于第二次解体。一是由于战略的调整会使得俄罗斯的工业基础越来越虚弱，二是俄罗斯的人口会越来越稀少。当俄罗斯有一天再度衰落，就会给全球政治留下很多巨大的真空。这将酿成全球政治的动荡。
俄罗斯周边的国家将趁虚而入。首先是东欧国家。在Friedman看来，西欧已经变得越来越年老、行动迟缓而且日益厌世，但东欧将有很强的后劲。尤其是在 俄罗斯向西扩张的过程中，美国势必会增加对东欧的支持，以遏制俄罗斯。他认为波兰将崛起，成为东欧的盟主。其次是中东地区。伊拉克已经被美国打败，陷入长 久的动荡；伊朗在宗教上属于伊斯兰的少数派，因此伊朗领头也会缺乏号召力；埃及在经济上过于落后；沙特阿拉伯过于腐败；最终，能够领导中东的可能会是土耳 其。土耳其是伊斯兰世界中唯一的工业化国家，也是北约的成员国、美国的盟友，而且，土耳其没有忘记往日奥斯曼帝国的荣光，因此，一旦北方的俄罗斯衰落下 去，土耳其就会将其力量向高加索山脉以北扩张。最后，是东亚地区。Friedman认为日本是这一地区最大的威胁。日本人口老化、资源稀缺，因此迫切需要 对外扩张，一是可能增加对中国东部的投资，利用中国的人口和资源，二是会觊觎俄罗斯在远东的资源。
在这些国家崛起的时候，美国最初都是支持的。美国支持东欧以遏制俄罗斯，支持土耳其以稳定中东、封锁俄罗斯，支持日本以制衡中国。但是，迟早会有一天冲突 会爆发。Friedman甚至虚构了一场未来的战争，发生在 2050年11月24日下午5点。他以这场假设的战争描述未来的地缘政治冲突和军事技术变革。真是绝好的好莱坞电影题材。
但是，Firedman坚信，这场战争的胜利者一定是美国。美国在军事、经济和政治上的优势会让挑战者再度失败。世界重新恢复和平，并迎来一次空前的经济繁荣。Friedman最离奇的预言是，一百年之后能够取代美国的新霸主是墨西哥。
21世纪世界人口会在达到一个顶峰之后逐渐下跌。这是我们在过去数百年内从来没有遇到的现象。人口的减少会加剧各国之间对移民的争夺。墨西哥邻近美国，而 且人口出生率又高，所以美国会千方百计的吸引墨西哥移民。但是，墨西哥移民和其他地方的移民不同。如果是华人移民到美国，意味着在很大程度上要把家庭、文 化、传统抛在后面，远渡重洋，融入美国熔炉。但是，墨西哥移民，尤其是美国南部的墨西哥移民却并非如此，他们可以早上在墨西哥，下午在美国。国界并不是一 个地理的概念，而是人口的概念。当大量的墨西哥人越过国界，来回穿梭的时候，美国和墨西哥的国界就会日益模糊，美国将逐渐被墨西哥化。
对Firedman这本书的评价已经超过了我的专业能力。但是，我知道的是，到我很老的时候，我都会记得曾经读过一本书，说墨西哥会灭了美国。而且，我也在考虑，是不是得学一点西班牙语了？
Q&A: George Friedman
George Eaton， NewStatesman.com
Published 27 August 2009
The author of the new book The Next 100 Years explains why China poses little threat to US supremacy, why Iran will struggle to build a nuclear weapon and why predictions matter
In your new book The Next 100 Years you reject those who argue that we are moving into what Fareed Zakaria describes as 'the post-American world'. Why do you believe that American power will be more durable than many predict?
I think we need to remember that the United States only became the undisputed global power in 1991. In the first half of the century, the United States was far from a global power. In the second half of the century it was locked in a Cold War that was, and certainly seemed to be, a desperate contest that the United States was not clearly winning at all times. Remember Sputnik, Berlin and Vietnam. Thus, if the United States is genuinely in decline, it is the shortest hegemony on record. Global power does not emerge quickly, nor does it erode that fast. The enormous percentage of the global economy that the United States constitutes may well wither, but if for no reason than structural ones, its decline cannot happen quickly. It should be noted that power is relative, so that a decline in American power requires the emergence of a replacement, either a single power or a coalition. Unlike Fareed Zakharia, I do not see the individual power or a coalition of powers that would usurp American primacy. In the end, great powers measure their time in centuries, not years or decades.
You do concede that "in due course ... the American epoch will end", though not necessarily this century. What are the main threats to US supremacy?
Great powers are most frequently broken by war or internal fragmentation. In the case of Britain, the World Wars of the 20th Century delivered blows to its economy and society that were staggering. The wars also produce new powers, the United States and Soviet Union both emerged from the wars towering over Britain. The Soviet Union in turn was shattered by internal fragmentation. Its institutions ceased functioning, shattering the regime and society. For the United States the threat of a war that exhausts American society opening the door for a greater power is the first threat. Over the long run, regional disintegration is the second threat. The United States is a vast country and stresses that are not visible at the moment can arise. One of the reasons I argue for American power in the 21st century is that I don't see the forces that will generate this very quickly. It will take a long time to get there.
Has the rise of China been overestimated by most analysts? After the United States will it be possible for another country to become a superpower?
I don't find superpower a useful term. There are global powers and regional powers -- and nations with little or no power. The United States is a global power. China is now a regional power. So the question is can China move from being a regional power to a global one? I don't think so. China's growth is not overstated, but its challenges are understated. Over a billion of its people live in a condition of poverty on the order of some of the poorest third world countries. This is an inherently unstable situation that focuses a great deal of the regime's attention, and certainly can't be addressed in anything short of generations. Militarily, its army is locked in by geography and is basically an internal security force. Building a navy of any substantial size requires not only building ships, but training the crews and the Admirals to man the fleet. Building a Navy that could challenge the United States would take generations. It is hard to see mechanically how they become a global power.
The only visible challenger to the United States would be a united Europe that operated as a single entity economically and militarily. It does not seem to me, particularly after the economic crisis, that European institutions work all that well. Europe chose national solutions and multinational cooperation. Europe is a coalition of regional powers, linked economically but lacking military force, let alone global military force. I don't see that changing. So I do not expect to see global challenges. I do expect to see substantial regional challengers to the United States in particular areas of the world, some of whom can be quite effective in a limited arena.
Is the European Union likely to become more or less significant in the future?
It is not clear to me what the European Union is. It is certainly nothing akin to a multi-national state, as sovereignty is genuinely in the hands of the national governments. It seems to be an attempt to have the benefits of scale without the abandonment of sovereignty. It reminds me of the United States in 1861 when the southern states argued that sovereignty rested with the states, and that membership in the federal union was an elective matter; that even as members, they were free to pursue their own independent policies. There was a conference held on this at Gettysburg in 1863 that ultimately settled the question. There is no force in Europe prepared to wage war to preserve the European Union, or to enforce the policies of the central government. Thus, Europe is a cooperative framework that individual states may ignore or withdraw from at will. I doubt that it will become more than this because of underlying mistrust among the nations and an unwillingness of the nations to subordinate their interests to the Union. It may stay where it is or decline. I find it difficult to imagine it growing stronger.
Your account of the next 100 years appears to downplay the impact that climate change will have on the world. But won't the extreme consequences of climate change have a damaging effect on states' internal cohesion and on the global economy?
I take climate change seriously. But I think the discussion is heading in the wrong direction. At the moment, the critical dimension of global warming is the surge in industrial output in China and India. They are not going to cut their emissions to preserve the wealth and lifestyle of the advanced industrial world. The advanced industrial world will talk about conservation, but will take no meaningful steps in that direction. To really effect massive reductions in green house gasses requires decline in the consumption of industrial goods and transportation that would be stunning. A series of small but earnest steps will not get us there. We require wholesale slashing of consumption. Politically, that isn't going to happen. The solution rests in replacing the hydrocarbon economy. In my book, I discuss what I think is a likely solution -- space based solar energy generation. I expect that to emerge as a new energy source because it can have a massive impact, it requires no intellectual breakthroughs, and it suits the interests of the United States Department of Defense. Conservation will not happen in my view. New technology will. This new technology will make the United States even more powerful and more unpleasant to deal with.
Iran currently shows no signs of abandoning its nuclear ambitions. Some fear that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger an arms race in the Middle East involving Saudi Arabia and Egypt. How great a threat do you think nuclear proliferation will be in the future?
I wrote a book called The Future of War in the 1990s which explored the lack of use of nuclear weapons. The lack of use has always fascinated me. As for Iran, I do not see it very close to a nuclear weapon, although it may be closer to a nuclear device -- something that can be tested in a fixed environment, but which isn't mechanically stable enough, rugged enough or small enough to be a weapon. The Iranians have struggled simply with nuclear enrichment. But the real key is making a weapon small enough to fit on a missile, and rugged enough to withstand 10gs on launch, entry into a vacuum where temperatures vary by hundreds of degrees in seconds, then survive the high temperatures of reentry and the terrific vibration -- and then be relied on to explode. This requires lots of engineers in disciplines like material science, advanced electronics and above all, quality assurance. Iranian capabilities seem to me to be far short of that. This leaves aside the launch platform. It is easy for a university freshman to sketch a nuclear weapon's basic design. Building it is harder. Pakistan is the last country to have achieved a deliverable nuclear weapon, and it exploded its first device in 1987. It's been over a generation since a nation last became a nuclear power. North Korea remains at a device level. So, proliferation is limited by the complexity of the engineering and implementation of the weapon.
What do you say to those who argue that prediction is a futile pursuit?
When the United States invaded Iraq, it was based on a prediction of what would happen. When investors placed their money with Bernie Madoff, they were predicting that it was a good investment. When we cross the street we predict that the car standing at the light won't suddenly press the accelerator. All of us, in our daily lives, must make the best prediction available on every level. Prediction is built into our existence.
The question of course is what the value is in a prediction of the next hundred years. For me, the reason had nothing to do with the next hundred years. It had to do with this moment -- trying to understand what is of enduring importance and what is of passing insignificance. In order to predict anything I must make that judgment and it was by thinking of the century that I gave myself the benchmark of what is important and what isn't. What is important would be what would shape the rest of the century. If I had been alive in 1900, I would like to think I would have identified the three most important things of the twentieth century: the collapse of the European imperium, the quadrupling of the human population and the revolutions in transportation and communications. I would hope that I wouldn't have selected the Boer War or the Spanish American War or investments in Russian Railway bonds as of transcendental significance, even though they were on everyone's mind.
This book was an attempt to define what mattered right now. For me it is three things: the rise of American power, the massive global decline in birth rates, and technologies to deal with population shortages. I may be wrong, but the only way I can get there is by focusing on the shape of the century, and distinguish the profoundly important from the noisy present.
|
|
|
|
|
|